Although the departments were sensitive to the politically symbolic aspects of an FCN contract, the report presented to IDCJ in early 1972 indicated that practical problems outweigh the benefits.  Australia has generally avoided FCN contracts due to previous difficulties with the United States.  The traditional approach with Japan was the convention on specific issues on an ad hoc basis, such as the 1956 Civil Aviation Convention, the 1970 Double Taxation Convention and the 1975 Cultural Agreement . In addition, the trade obligations of an FCN treaty do not overlap with other international agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), of which Australia and Japan were members.  The economic pragmatism that characterized the international sphere after world war II facilitated the beginning of a nascent commodity trading relationship between Australia and Japan, formalized by the 1975 trade agreement.  However, the growing economic interdependence between the two countries in the 1970s gave impetus to the extension of agreements beyond trade to other issues such as immigration and investment.  In addition, Japan`s perception of a discriminatory Australian policy has begun to weigh on the stability of bilateral relations.  This obstacle to the relationship shows the statement of the head of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Naohiro Amaya, “it is very unpleasant and uncomfortable for Australia to impose discriminatory and insulting restrictions on the entry of Japanese technicians and skilled workers.” This economic and political pressure has led to the awareness of the need to reassess the bilateral framework of relations and agreements with Japan. Chile and Japan announced their intention to discuss the possibility of negotiating a free trade agreement on 22 November at the 2004 APEC summit in Santiago, Chile. Following the evaluation of the results of the Chile-Japan Joint Task Force (JSG), which held four meetings, the two countries announced their intention to begin on 18 November 2005 in Seoul, Korea, at the APEC Heads of State Meeting. The Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement between Chile and Japan was signed on March 27, 2007 in Tokyo, Japan. The Berlin mandate was recognized in the Kyoto Protocol, as developing countries were not subject to emission reduction commitments during the first Kyoto commitment period.
 However, the great potential for emissions growth in developing countries has strained negotiations on this issue.  In the final agreement, the Clean Development Mechanism was developed to limit emissions in developing countries, but so that developing countries do not bear the costs of reducing emissions.  The general assumption was that developing countries would be subject to quantitative obligations in subsequent commitment periods and that, at the same time, developed countries would meet their first-round obligations.  On 15 June 2007, the Japanese Parliament approved the Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement between Chile and Japan.